| Monitoring Screening
and Searching Wolfsberg Statement |
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Preamble |
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The Wolfsberg Group of financial institutions
(the “Wolfsberg Group”) has previously produced: Global
Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking; The Wolfsberg
Statement on The Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; and
The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent
Banking. All of these have stated the need for appropriate monitoring
of transactions and customers to identify potentially unusual or
suspicious activity and transactions, and for reporting such to
competent authorities. The Guidelines, Statement and Principles,
however, have not addressed issues related to the development of
risk-based processes for monitoring, screening and searching of
transactions and customers. Therefore, the Wolfsberg Group is making
this statement to identify issues that should be addressed in order
that financial institutions are able to develop suitable monitoring,
screening and searching processes.
The Wolfsberg Group acknowledges that the risk profile may be different
for a financial institution as a whole and for its individual units
depending on the business conducted in a particular unit (e.g. Retail,
Private Banking, Correspondent Banking, Broker Dealer). It must
be recognised, however, that any process for monitoring, screening
or searching is limited to detecting those clients and transactions
that have identifiable characteristics that are distinguishable
from apparently legitimate behaviour. Because money launderers and
terrorists will take all available actions to attempt to disguise
their transactions and accounts by providing them with an air of
legitimacy, it becomes difficult, if not sometimes impossible, to
make any distinctions between good and bad clients and acceptable
and potentially illicit transactions. We are, however, committed
to implementing processes and methods and making use of information
technology systems where appropriate, so that we, to the best of
our ability, have in place efficient and effective processes and
systems to identify potential suspicious activity. |
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Definitions |
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'Real-time
Screening (Screening): Defined as the screening or
filtering of payment instructions (i.e. wire or funds transfers) prior
to their execution in order to prevent making funds available in breach
of sanctions, embargoes and other measures. |
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'Retroactive
Searches (Searches): Defined as the identification
of specific past transactions, as well as existing and closed accounts.
Transaction Monitoring (Monitoring):
Defined as the process of monitoring transactions
after their execution in order to identify unusual transactions,
including monitoring single transactions, as well as transaction
flows.
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Role of Financial
Institutions |
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Financial institutions must have appropriate
processes in place that allow for the identification of unusual
activity and unusual patterns of activity or transactions. Since
unusual transactions, patterns or activity need not be suspicious
in all cases, financial institutions must have the ability to analyse
and determine if the activity, patterns or transactions are suspicious
in nature with regard to, among other things, potential money laundering.
Suspicious activity, patterns and transactions must be reported
to competent authorities in accordance with local laws, regulations
or rules.
Monitoring of account activity and transactions flowing through
a financial institution is one means of ensuring that this role
is fulfilled. Financial institutions should have processes in place
to screen payment instructions against the lists provided by competent
governmental authorities to identify amongst others, potential terrorists
or terrorist financing. Financial institutions should respond expeditiously
to search requests from competent governmental authorities.
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Risk-Based Approach
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Traditionally, laws, regulations and
rules with regard to monitoring, screening and searching issued
by some governmental authorities have not embraced a risk-based
approach. Instead governmental directives have focused on collecting
data from financial institutions by establishing thresholds, such
as large cash transaction reports, or by providing specific information
on which financial institutions must react, such as embargoes or
sanctions. Implicit in these collection and reporting obligations
is that activity or transactions that are being reported may be
suspicious or illegal. However, because, for example, not all large
transactions are suspicious, monitoring should not be limited to
focusing on thresholds, but rather should be aimed at recognising
unusual activity in comparison to known and expected activities.
Similar to the risk-based approach for conducting due diligence
at account opening, monitoring, and some screening and searching
processes should also be risk-based. A risk-based approach for monitoring
and relevant screening and searching should be closely linked to
the risk-based approach used at account opening and such an approach
should consider both elements that increase as well as reduce risk.
Where financial institutions know their clients better, including
understanding their intended activity at the institution, the greater
is the ability to identify gaps between current activity and past
and expected activities, which in turn provides financial institutions
with critical information to assist in determining whether unusual
or suspicious activity exists.
Financial institutions should consider the use of information technology
systems in the context of the risk associated with the business
units, e.g. size, nature of business conducted and overall monitoring
process. Therefore, a risk-based approach may require a differentiated
level of implementation of real-time screening, retroactive searches
and transaction monitoring systems. |
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4.1 |
Real-time Screening |
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Real-time transaction screening is the
screening or filtering of payment instructions (i.e. wire or funds
transfers) prior to their execution. Real-time screening is typically
used for enforcing embargoes and sanctions. Real-time screening
can be most effectively used for the identification of payments
to or from persons or entities for which governmental authorities
have provided notice to financial institutions. While it is crucial
that screening is undertaken on a real-time basis in order to block
affected payments before completion, it can adversely affect Straight
Through Processing and, therefore, requires timely action on the
part of governmental authorities in order to allow appropriate payments
to be completed within the time periods specified by the clearing
and settlement systems.
In order to enhance the quality of real-time screening, the Wolfsberg
Group believes that the following points are of utmost importance:
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real-time screening should only be required
to be used for screening or filtering related to embargoes or sanctions,
and financial institutions should not be required to engage in real-time
screening for names other than those specified by relevant governmental
authorities;
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real-time screening technology should be
driven by responses that only require a true or false answer to matches
with the applicable lists provided by governmental authorities;
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financial institutions should be able to
rely on the quality and completeness of the names provided by governmental
authorities; and
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criteria should be established as to acceptable
amounts and types of information that must be provided to financial
institutions to conduct real-time screening to include such things
as, full name, date of birth and other relevant unique identifiers
which should mitigate the significant number of "false positives"
(i.e. apparent matches that prove incorrect on substantive review).
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4.2 |
Retroactive Searches |
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Retroactive searches may be the result
of ongoing risk-based due diligence or enhanced due diligence pursuant
to policies and procedures implemented by financial institutions.
Retroactive searches may also be the result of requests by governmental
authorities or the issuance of judicial processes, such as subpoenas
or search warrants, that require financial institutions to search
for specific data.
The Wolfsberg Group believes that retroactive searches provide
a valuable tool for locating and identifying transactions and accounts
of interest. However, there is not uniformity among financial institutions
and governmental authorities as to how retroactive searches should
be conducted and what records at an institution should be the subject
of such searches. The lack of uniformity and clarity can (and often
does) lead to time consuming manual searches.
When financial institutions engage in retroactive searches as the
result of their own processes, care should be taken to ensure that
such searches are risk-based. Financial institutions should identify
those data sources that will allow for the most effective and efficient
searches to identify the appropriate data based on the risks associated
with the customer or transactions.
As a means of developing uniformity that will provide necessary
assistance to financial institutions and ultimately produce retroactive
searches of significant utility to law enforcement activities, the
Wolfsberg Group recommends that governmental authorities, in consultation
with financial institutions, identify specific types of data that
it would be of value to maintain electronically (e.g. client identifying
information, beneficial owner information, transaction information)
and financial institutions should seek to create such information
in an electronic format that would then support effective and efficient
retroactive searches.
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4.3 |
Transaction Monitoring |
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The majority of ongoing monitoring for
unusual and potentially suspicious activity is accomplished by transaction
monitoring. Risk-based transaction monitoring for potential money
laundering requires the development of risk models that identify
the potential risks to money laundering and provide a means of ranking
the risks in order to compare the risks to completed transactions.
An appropriate transaction monitoring process will compare the transaction
information against the identified risks, such as geographic location
of transaction, the type of products and services being offered
and the type of client engaging in the transaction with the different
typologies for money laundering and other ilicit activites to determine
if a transaction is unusual or suspicious.
This approach requires that a model exist that supports the identification
of transactions that deviate from a standard model or benchmark
and allows a risk-based review and analysis. Transaction monitoring
based on such a concept provides financial institutions with the
necessary coverage for review of transactions that are not subject
to real-time screening or retroactive searches. The Wolfsberg Group
intends to continue to develop guidance for
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a process that permits reasonable reviewing
of transactions;
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identifying reasonable, risk-based scores
/ alerts; |
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ensuring comparability between financial institutions
as to the robustness of the model; |
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establishing industry standards for understanding levels
or degrees of "unusualness" or suspicion; and
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ability to replace or enhance current process of
monitoring solely for transactions exceeding specific thresholds.
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Standards for
Risk-Based Transaction Monitoring |
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An effective risk-based transaction
monitoring process should:
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compare the client’s account/transaction
history to the client’s specific profile information and a relevant
peer group and/or compare the clients account/transaction history
against established money laundering criteria/scenarios, in order
to identify patterns of suspicious activity or anomalies |
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establish a process to compare customer
or transaction specific data against risk scoring models;
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be capable of recognizing patterns and
of "learning" which transactions are normal for a client
rather than designating certain transactions as unusual (for example,
not all large transaction are unusual and may easily be explained); |
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issue alerts if unusual transactions are
identified; |
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track those alerts in order to ensure that
they are appropriately managed within the institution and that suspicious
activity is reported to the authorities as required; |
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maintain an audit trail for inspection
by the institution's audit function and by bank supervisors; and |
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provide appropriate aggregated information
and statistics. |
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Conclusion |
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Risk-based transaction monitoring, real-time
screening and retroactive searches must be embedded in an integrated
anti-money laundering program. Past experience indicates that those
current governmental standards for monitoring for suspicious activity,
which have tended not to be risk-based, are not effective enough
for identifying potential money laundering activity. The Wolfsberg
Group believes that a risk-based approach will enhance the effectiveness
of monitoring unusual or potentially suspicious activity, to the
extent such activity is distinguishable from legitimate activity.
It is for this reason that the Wolfsberg Group supports the introduction
of risk-based monitoring models that set forth uniform standards
or baselines while being sufficiently flexible to meet the needs
of individual financial institutions. The Wolfsberg Group is committed
to the development of appropriate standards and benchmarks towards
establishing effective risk-based monitoring, screening and searching
models.
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1) The Wolfsberg Group
consists of the following leading international financial institutions:
ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Banco Santander Central Hispano S.A., Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd., Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse Group,
Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J. P. Morgan Chase, Société
Générale, UBS AG. |
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